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In a peaceable, secular pluralist society, one would at the very least 
expect that freedom of choice would include the freedom of physicians to 
decide on religious grounds not to be associated with the provision of 
abortion. However, the 1989 Ethics Manual of the American College of 
Physicians I requires at least material cooperation in abortion, even if the 
physician holds that abortion is objectively a seriously evil act. The manual 
states: 
A physician who objects to abortion on moral, religious, or ethical grounds need 
not become involved , either by proffering advice to the patient or by involvement 
in the surgical procedure. The physician does have a duty to assure that the 
patient is provided the option of receiving competent medical advice and care 
from a qualified colleague who does not impose his or her personal convictions 
upon the patient. 2 
Superficially, this passage might appear to meet the moral needs of those 
who recognize abortion to be a seriously evil act. However, though a 
physician is not required to offer "advice", the physician is required to 
"assure that the patient is provided the option of receiving competent 
medical advice." For those who hold abortion to be a seriously evil act, this 
position is sirr.ilar to asserting that those opposed to rape need not give 
technical advice to would-be rapists; it is enough to refer interested 
individuals to those willing to provide instruction. 
The American College of Physicians could have taken a substantial step 
toward respecting the rights of conscientious objection. This could have 
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been accomplished by stating that those opposed on moral grounds to 
abortion have a right to exempt themselves from any obligation to provide 
advice regarding abortion, if they inform patients of their objections when 
the physician/ patient relationship is initially being formed. Such a 
disclosure could include informing patients that many consider that the 
standard of medical care requires advising patients in particular 
circumstances of the possibility of employing prenatal screening and 
abortion if the patients are at significant risk of having a child with a severe 
congenital defect, but that the physician is not free to do this for moral 
reasons. The disclosure could then end with the physician indicating a 
strong opposition to abortion on moral grounds. A condition of accepting 
the services of such a physician would be to forego information concerning 
abortion, even when such information might become relevant according to 
the general standard of care. 
Absence of Disclosure 
In the absence of such a disclosure discharging the obligation to provide 
further information concerning abortion, conscientious physicians may 
suffer significant costs at tort law. Steps must be taken towards a clear 
recognition in public policy that such an advance disclosure will relieve the 
disclosing physician of all civil liability for subsequent failures to inform 
patients of those instances when the general standard of care would include 
prenatal diagnosis and abortion. A statement by the American College of 
Physicians regarding such rights of conscience would contribute 
substantially to establishing the standard of care in a way that clearly 
acknowledges the integrity of the physician's conscience. The current 
statement accomplishes the very opposite. 
It is worth noting that the American College of Physicians specifically 
supports the possible probity of civil disobedience with respect to 
maintaining confidentiality. "If the physician thinks that commitment to 
the patient's welfare overrides duty to the law, the physician can ethically 
refuse to give information not released by the patient, but must recognize 
that this is an act of conscientious objection that may have legal 
consequences."3 However, justified civil disobedience is not noted to 
include actions by physicians predicated on an obligation to avoid 
violating significant principles of conscience with regard to abortion. 
Indeed , the tone of the American College of Physicians' Ethics Manual 
does not show sympathy to such matters of conscience. The physician who 
refuses to participate in abortion is characterized as an individual who 
"imposes his or her personal convictions upon the patient".4 One wonders 
what this implies for a physician who disclosed that the standard of care 
supported prenatal diagnosis and selective abortion, who supplied the 
name of a physician who would provide the relevant advice and services 
but merely added, in an attempt to avoid formal cooperation, "However, I 
would consider you to be placing yourself in a proximate occasion of 
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committing murder and incurring eternal damnation if you were to seek 
such advice." The tone of the manual raises the suspicion that such a 
statement would be regarded as verbally coercive or a gross example of 
"imposing his or her personal convictions." Surely there is no appreciation 
in the manual of the fact that a patient is imposing her moral viewpoint on 
the treating physician if tort law requires a specific disclosure that a 
physician holds to be morally improper. The manual does not credibly 
address the ways in which individuals may avoid compromising their moral 
integrity through legally imposed formal and / or material cooperation in 
what is viewed to be a serious objective moral evil. 
Moral Diversity/Personal Conscience 
Taking seriously both the moral diversity in our society and the 
importance of personal conscience requires the development of proced ures 
that will allow physicians to protect their moral integrity by disclosing at the 
initial physician/ patient interaction that certain procedures will not be 
performed and that the "advisability" of certain interventions will not be 
discussed or enterta ined, and that if patients wish such information or 
services they should consult a different physician. 
If it is not possible for physicians and private institutions fully and 
completely to remove themselves from any association with medical 
procedures they find seriously morally problematic, not only will their 
consciences be violated , but the seriousness of moral convictions will be 
undermined in our society. Many moral convictions are properly private 
matters, in the sense that they do not warrant the use of coercive force for 
their realization. But they are not merely matters of taste or relics from a 
religious past to be tolerated by the state only if they in no way limit the 
choices of those who do not share in those convictions. A peaceable, 
secular pluralist society must, at the very least, allow those with concrete 
moral convictions peaceably to witness to those convictions and peaceably 
to refuse association with disapproved practices. The privatization of 
moral convictions in a secular society should not lead either to the 
trivialization of individual and institutional moral commitments nor to the 
erosion of basic rights to freedom of moral association. Nor should 
licensure by the state be regarded as preempting the peaceable expression 
of serious moral convictions in the physician / patient relationship. 
Otherwise the state will coercively establish a particular secular ideology 
adverse to many religious views. When differences in conscience can be 
resolved by recognizing a basic secular right of freedom of association , 
then the problem can be solved without harm to anyone who has not freely 
consented to the risks involved. Otherwise, religious convictions are not 
only limited to their expression in areas where they coerce no one (a 
cardinal tenet of a limited democracy) but to areas where they 
inconvenience no one. If the second condition is imposed, one abandons 
the notion of a limited democracy and imposes a secular civil religion. 
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